Firearms, Miranda and The Shelter Resident

Two recent cases out of Massachusetts have come to my attention that I believe merit discussion.

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Commnwealth v. Porter, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 85 (2008), examined whether a juvenile defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a shelter that he and his mother inhabited in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston.

While residing in the shelter, word spread that the juvenile was harboring a firearm and ammunition. After the shelter director became worried of harm or the threat of imminent bodily injury, she contacted the Boston Police Department, who arrived on scene and discussed the shelter’s policies regarding firearm possession. It turned out that the shelter had a zero tolerance policy for a firearm possession in the shelter. The police obtained a master key from the shelter director, entered the room, and seized the firearm and ammunition. The court refused to suppress the evidence, on the grounds that “Here, the defendant and his mother lived in a room in a twenty-four room shelter. The department paid their rent. They could not choose their room, and could be transferred to another room if deemed necessary by the shelter. They voluntarily agreed to live in a highly regulated environment, where shelter staff were charged with maintaining order, discipline, and a safe environment.” Porter, at 92. In short, the Court stated that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public shelter.

What I found particularly fascinating about this case was the court’s decision regarding the statements made by the defendant as the police entered the room. When the police entered the room, the defendant stated that “the gun had no bodies on it, it’s clean”. The court opined that the statement was “…not the product of custodial interrogation, and thus, does not implicate Miranda. Although the defendant may very well have been in custody at the time of the statements, the judge found that the defendant made the statements spontaneously and not in response to any specific questioning. The defendant concedes this point. Accordingly, we reverse the judge's suppression of the statements.” Porter, at 96.

At any rate, the case is worth noting because to the dual application of the 4th amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as facts that warrant Miranda.